



# Data Breach and Multiple Points to Stop It

Danfeng (Daphne) Yao
Department of Computer Science
Virginia Tech





// Create a trust manager that does not validate certificate of TrustManager[] trustAllCerts = new TrustMana

public java.security.cert.X509Certificate

[ICSE '18,SecDev '17]

#### MORGAN & CLAYPOOL PUBLISHERS

#### **Anomaly Detection** as a Service

and Opportunities

Danfeng (Daphne) Yao Xiaokui Shu Long Cheng Salvatore J. Stolfo

Synthesis Lectures on INFORMATION SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND TRUST

```
getAcceptedIssuere() {return null;}
    public void checkClientTrusted (...) {}
    public void checkServerTrusted (...) {}
// Install the all-trusting trust manager
try {
  SSLContext sc = SSLContext.getInstance("SS
  sc.init(null, trustAllCerts, new java.secu
      SecureRandom());
  HttpsURLConnection.setDefaultSSLSocketFactor
      .getSocketFactory());
  catch (Exception e) {}
```

new X509TrustManager() {

# Challenges, Advances,


Elisa Bertino & Ravi Sandhu, Series Editors

#### Acknowledgment






Xiaokui Shu (IBM Research)



Fang Liu (Palo Alto Networks)



Jing Zhang (AMD)



Elisa Bertino (Purdue)



Ali Butt (VT)



Wu Feng (VT)



#### Ford pickup truck F-150 has 150 million LOC

Ford GT has over 10 million lines of code

F-22 Raptor has 2 million lines of code

Boeing 787 Dreamliner has 7 million lines of code



Hacking Nov 2016


## Ransomware attack on San Francisco public transit gives everyone a free ride

"You Hacked, ALL Data Encrypted. Contact For Key(cryptom27@yandex.com)ID:681,Enter."






#### Types of vulnerabilities in industrial control systems



https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/ICS-Security-2017-eng.pdf https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/critical-infrastructure-more/



>> SECURITY

**SECURITY** 



#### **How 3 Local Governments** Mitigated Ransomware Attacks






#### Target data breach




**BUSINESS NEWS** 


#### Target Settles 2013 Hacked Customer Data Breach For \$18.5 Million

by Reuters / May.24.2017 / 10:49 AM ET / Source: Reuters



#### Target data breach (Nov. 27 to Dec. 15, 2013)





- Phishing attack against Fazio
   Mechanical Service
- 2. Accessing the Target network
- 3. Gaining access to vulnerable machines
- 4. Installing malware on PoS terminals
- 5. Collecting card information from PoS
- 6. Moving data out of the Target network
- 7. Aggregating stolen card and person data

ree4@exploit.im: http://plasmon.rghost.ru/44699041/image.png

hidden: how does it keep the data (intercepted credit cards)?

reed4@exploit.im: from left side it is files, time.txt, then you click on it and you will find dumps in browser in plaintext

**hidden:** are there any differences in terms of infected Point-of-Sale systems?

**ree4@exploit.im:** no, but there are some nuances, for examples it doesn't work on Verifone

hidden: really? I have Verifones ...

**reed4@exploit.im:** it grabs dumps from memory, Verifone can be connected to PC, but it will be "secured", you need standalone Point-of-Sale terminals with monitor and Windows

hidden: how much?

ree4@exploit.im: 2000 USD

March 23, 2013


12:35:17 \_ а как данные хранит внутри? можешь пример дать или скрин чтобы понимать? там вида - карта - трек или как? читабельно? 12:36:08 ree4@exploit.im: вот сбоку где файлы, т.е.: время.txt, по нему нажимаешь и открывается текстовик в браузере, там дампы 12:36:21 ree4@exploit.im: номер=остальное \_\_\_\_\_\_: есть какие-то нюансы по моделям посов? нормально ставится/ админа требует? 12:36:48 ree4@exploit.im: ньансов нет никаких, а к посам есть требования 12:37:04 ree4@exploit.im: например на верифонах и им подобные - не будет работать ..... у меня как раз серия верифонов 12:37:24 ree4@exploit.im: нужны самомстоятельные посы с монитором и виндой 12:37:57 ree4@exploit.im: ну троян грабит дампы из памяти, а верифоны подключаются к компу и дамп уже идёт сколько стоит? в бинарнике продаеь или сорцах? 12:39:49 ree4@exploit.im: 2000\$ 12:39:57 ree4@exploit.im: билд 1 ок а в аренду даешь елси пол %?

12:34:24 ree4@exploit.im: http://plasmon.rghost.ru/44699041/image.png

https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/213 37/cyber-crime/blackpos-malware.html

#### BlackPOS (memory scrapper malware)

- Runs as a Windows service "POSWDS"
- Scans a list of processes that interact with the card reader
- Uploads credit cards to a compromised server (internal network repository)





https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabssecurity-intelligence/new-blackpos-malwareemerges-in-the-wild-targets-retail-accounts/

#### How can a HVAC vendor's credential access Target's internal networks?



Home

**About Us** 

Services

Our Work

Careers

Cont



Ross E. Fazio

Ross A. Fazio **President Executive Vice President** 



**Jeff Rupert** Vice President of

"Fazio Mechanical does not perform remote monitoring of or control of heating, cooling and refrigeration systems for Target," Fazio said (Feb. 2014).

# Fazio's credential also had access to other portals in Target



But how can a billing system credential access Target's internal networks?

#### FireEye's IDS







Target's security team in Bangalore received FireEye alerts; sent alerts to Target headquarters

FireEye's auto-malware-delete function was turned off

#### FireEye makes alerts worthwhile again



It takes 157 minutes for an expensive expert analyst to correctly identify a true positive alert. That's a lo

Tb

dengine identifies true positive alerts without volumes of alerts or false positives. Since set on leaves them free for more important tasks. It even finds signs of threats for previously untual intelligence accompanies validated alerts to help your analysts quickly prioritize alerts attacker profile, threat severity and attack scale and scope.

157 minutes to confirm a true positive

rehensive visibility across the entire lifecycle to reduce alerts by up to 76 percent. By seein erts that would be generated from subsequent stages of the attack (e.g. callbacks) and alerts

"We haven't seen any false positives and the alerts engoing on across our whole infrastructure. And by gettiminimize wasting resources on having to clean up a be posture is even more valuable for us."

- SCOTT ADAMS, MANAGER

Research opportunities: better warning design so admins & analysts pay attention

"FireEye ... is cutting edge. But it takes love and care and feeding. You have to watch it and monitor it."

-- John Strand, Black Hills InfoSec (regarding Target data breach)

- 1. Fear
- Obedience
- Greed
- Helpfulness

#### Hacker psychology: Understanding the 4 emotions of social engineering

And some key considerations for better positioning your employees against falling prey to these types of attacks



















By Austin Whipple, Senior Security Engineer, BetterCloud Network World | MAY 13, 2016 1:07 PM PT

#### PCI Compliance is just a baseline



"Target was certified as meeting the standard for the payment card industry (PCI) in Sept. 2013."

-- Gregg Steinhafel (Target then CEO, stepped down in 2014)



PCI data security standard is a standard for securing electronic payments

Discover Network requires all Merchants, Acquirers, Third Party Processors and Payment Service Providers ("Company") to comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard ("PCI DSS") located at <a href="www.discovernetwork.com">www.discovernetwork.com</a> and/or <a href="www.discovernetwork.com">www.discovernetwork.com</a> and will see a represent a second and will see a represent

Section	1 - Company Co	ntact Information						
Date	18 98 0							
	ny Legal Name							
	ance Contact Na		- 3					
Compliance Contact Phone Number			(XXX)XX	X-XXXX				
Complia	ance Contact E-n	nail Address						
Section		CI Compliance Status		anna atalua (a				
	1	ame/Title of Officer) certifies the folk			Note that the second of the se			
☐ COMPLIANT		(Company) has achieved full compliance with the PCI DSS as of (date of compliance).  Name of Qualified Security Assessor (if applicable): Proceed to Section 4.						
NON-COMPLIANT			(Company) has not achieved full compliance with the PCI DSS as of (date). Company					
Please s required	select the appropr		quirement. I	f you answer '	"NO" to any of the requirements, you are description of the actions being taken to meet			
PCI Req.	Description of Requirement		Compliance Status (select one)		Remediation Date and Actions (if "Non- Compliant" was selected in the "Compliance			
			Compliant	Non- Compliant	Status" column)			
1	Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data							
2	Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other security parameters							
3	Protect stored cardholder data							
	Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open,							
4	public networks							
5	Use and regularly update anti-virus software		├─ <mark> </mark> Pr	Protect stored cardholder dat				
6	Develop and maintain secure systems and applications			Гп				
7	Restrict access to	Regularly te	st sec	urity s	systems and processe			

Assign a unique ID to each person with computer

8

access



## Multi-factor authentication -- A lesson learned by PCI from the Target breach

**8.3** Secure all individual non-console administrative access and all remote access to the CDE using multi-factor authentication.

Note: Multi-factor authentication requires that a minimum of two of the three authentication methods (see Requirement 8.2 for descriptions of authentication methods) be used for authentication. Using one factor twice (for example, using two separate passwords) is not considered multi-factor authentication.

**8.3.1** Incorporate multi-factor authentication for all non-console access into the CDE for personnel with administrative access.

Note: This requirement is a best practice until January 31, 2018, after which it becomes a requirement.

**8.3.2** Incorporate multi-factor authentication for all remote network access (both user and administrator, and including third party access for support or maintenance) originating from outside the entity's network.



# LEVEL 1 6M + Process more than 6 million Visa transactions per year, regardless of channel.

Be identified as Level 1 by any card association.

#### 1-6M

LEVEL 2

Process **1 to 6 million** credit card transactions annually across all channels.

#### 20K-1M

LEVEL 3

Process **20,000 to 1 million** e-commerce credit card transactions annually.

#### <20K

LEVEL 4

Process fewer than 20,000 e-commerce transactions annually, or process fewer than 1 million credit card transactions annually across all channels.

#### SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

Complete a ROC annually by a Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) \*. This means an on-site audit needs to occur every year.

Quarterly scans by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) \*.

An AOC that verifies everything meets PCI standards.

Conduct an annual
Self-Assessment
Questionnaire (SAQ) \*.

Quarterly scans by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV).

An AOC that verifies everything meets PCI standards.

Conduct an annual Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ)\*.

Quarterly scans by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV).

An AOC that verifies everything meets PCI standards.

Conduct an annual Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) \*.

Quarterly scans by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV).

An AOC that verifies everything meets PCI standards.

https://www.plumvoice.com/resources/blog/achieve-pci-compliant-tech/

Results: 49

## PCI approved scanning vendors Security Standards Council



COMPANY	PLACE OF BUSINESS	PRODUCT NAME	EMAIL CONTACT	SERVED	NSCERTIFICA NUMBER
AccessIT Group, Inc **In Remediation**	United States	AccessIT Group ASV	Petem® Vag	ue	5086- 01-01
AccessIT Group, Inc **In Remediation**  Alert Logic, Inc.	United	itees ar	alertlogic.com	North America, Europe, Japan	4222- 01-12
Aperi But secu	United States	Aperia Pro Scan	jnix@aperiasolutions. com	Global	5051- 01-07
AppSec Consulting	United States	AppSec Certified	info@appsecconsulti ng.com	North America	3834- 01-12
AT&T Consulting Solutions	United	AT&T	pci@att.com	Global	5024-

#### Or looks rather basic



#### **Test Scope**

The vulnerability scanning service covers all machines in the given internet address range from which responses were detected. For each machine detected, the services an characteristics of the machine are analysed.

TCP/IP characteristics	ICMP responses and other TCP/IP characteristics of the machine are examined. These are used to report the detected operating system () ften including the version) and system uptime where available.		
TCP services	A table of available TCP services and relevant further information is produced. Netcraft's tests identify the network service on each port — in particular, standard network services running or non-standard ports are identified and fully tested.		
UDP services	A table of UDP ports which are believed to be open, and any information obtained from them. Note that due to the design of the UDP protocol, false positives are common in identifying active UDP ports, especially if firewalls are filtering content from these ports. If filtering is in place, our		

### Sophistication of the approval process for PCI scanners?



PCI council allows infinite retesting, Training materials available

Specialized scan

Advanced threats


How can researchers help?

In-depth scan


Deployable tools

Transparency

## Other technical vulnerabilities? Theory 1 – Issues in how Target admins managed Ariba



#### Theory 2



#### Missed opportunities



Lack of transparency makes it difficult to learn from past failures

#### Target's improvements (April 29, 2014)



Improved monitoring and logging of system activity



Installed application whitelisting POS systems and

Implemented POS management tools

Improved firewall rules and policies



Limited or disabled vendor access to their network

Disabled, reset, or reduced privileges on over 445,000 Target personnel and contractor accounts



Expanded the use of two-factor authentication and password vaults

Trained individuals on password rotation

#### Target also joined 2 cybersecurity threatsharing initiatives




R-CISC
THE RETAIL IS AC

Financial Services
Information Sharing and
Analysis Center


Retail Cyber Intelligence
Sharing Center

National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center



https://www.theverge.com/2016/5/6/11601248/nccic-tour-photos-cyber-attack-hq-dhs

#### DHS NCCIC welcomes you to visit



# Threat intelligence – How can researchers help?

Analyze security guarantees

Understand security limitations

What's useful beyond eye candies?

Know the types of actionable items

#### Equifax data breach -- 145.5 million consumers affected


Apache Struts Vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638)

2017-03-06: vulnerability announced on along with a patch

2017-03-07: an exploit released


2017-07-30: Equifax patched

146 days: Time to patch at Equifax



https://www.gracefulsecurity.com/equifax-breach-timeline/ https://blog.blackducksoftware.com/equifax-apache-struts-cve-2017-5638-vulnerability

#### Vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute commands



Apache Struts: an open-source web application framework for Java EE web applications

#### Apache Struts FileUploadInterceptor class

For error-handling during file upload (e.g., parsing & size errors)

```
1. if (multiWrapper.hasErrors()) {
    for (LocalizedMessage error : multiWrapper.getErrors()) {
3.
     if (validation != null) {
       validation.addActionError(LocalizedTextUtil.findText(error.getClazz(),
4.
error.getTextKey(), ActionContext.getContext().getLocale(),
error.getDefaultMessage(), error.getArgs()));
                                       Problem: Struts' error message
                                       render engine shows untrusted
                                       properties back to the user
```


#### An attack header

### What happens:

- 1. FileUploadInterceptor cannot parse the header;
- 2. It attempts to put together an error message;
- 3. It evaluates/executes the OGNL expression from the attacker.

```
oot@sh:~/struts2-S2-045# python exploit.py http://127.0.0.1:8080/2.3.15.1-showcase/showcase.action "ls -l"
[*] CVE: 2017-5638 - Apache Struts2 S2-045
[*] cmd: ls -l
total 12
                               12 Nov 15 09:37 conf -> /etc/tomcat8
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root
                     root
drwxr-xr-x 2 tomcat8 tomcat8 4096 Nov 15 09:37 lib
                               17 Nov 15 09:37 logs -> ../../log/tomcat8
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root
                     root
drwxr-xr-x 2 root
                             4096 Mar 7 00:55 policy
                     root
drwxrwxr-x 3 tomcat8 tomcat8 4096 Mar  7 01:34 webapps
                               19 Nov 15 09:37 work -> ../../cache/tomcat8
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root
                     root
```

# XSS Negligence at Equifax



In addition, no Intrusion Detection Systems

# Equifax's freeze PIN is the timestamp -- predictable




OMG, Equifax security freeze PINs are worse than I thought. If you froze your credit today 2:15pm ET for example, you'd get PIN 0908171415.



Tony Webster ♥ @webster · 8 Sep 2017

Verified PIN format w/ several people who froze today. And I got my PIN in 2007 —same exact format. Equifax has been doing this for A DECADE.

### "admin/admin" login for Equifax Argentina employee portal



# Would PCI compliance have saved Equifax?

### PCI DSS Requirement 6

6.2 Protect all system components and software from known vulnerabilities by installing applicable vendor-supplied security patches. Install critical security patches within one month of release.

### PCI DSS Requirement 11

Use network intrusion detection and/or intrusion prevention techniques to detect and/or prevent intrusions into the network. Monitor all traffic at the perimeter of the cardholder data environment

Research opportunities: Can these and other PCI DSS requirements be automatically checked?

# Formatting Excel files and accidental data leak

[Feb. 2017] An employee emailed a company spreadsheet to his spouse, who didn't work at Boeing

### 36,000 Boeing employees' data is leaked

- names
- social security numbers
- dates of birth
- places of birth
- employee ID numbers
- accounting department codes




	Globally	Russia etc.	China	N. America	W. Europe	E. Markets	APAC	Mid- East	Japan
Base	4,438	518	208	400	1,576	611	822	105	198
Vulnerabilities / flaws in existing software	36%	50%	38%	33%	32%	37%	37%	23%	26%
Accidental leaks/sharing of data by staff	29%	34%	42%	26%	26%	25%	34%	25%	23%
Loss/theft of mobile devices by staff	26%	19%	27%	22%	29%	24%	29%	25%	28%
Intentional leaks/sharing of data by staff	21%	22%	32%	12%	18%	21%	30%	18%	14%
Information leaked/inappropriately shared on a mobile device	20%	18%	30%	16%	18%	22%	27%	13%	11%
Securityfailure by third party supplier	16%	10%	25%	14%	15%	17%	23%	11%	10%
Fraud by employees	16%	17%	18%	11%	14%	18%	21%	15%	11%
None	17%	14%	9%	26%	19%	14%	11%	30%	27%


### Data Leak Detection as a Service?

Threat model: accidental leak; a DLP provider is a semi-honest adversary




## Fuzzy Fingerprints





# Data owner sends sensitive collections and content collections to DLD provider

N-gram generation & Rabin fingerprints



### Detection of transformed accidental data leak?

### Auto-formatting (WordPress)

# The application layer contains the higher-level protocols used by most applications for network communication. Examples of application layer protocols include the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP).[19] Data coded according to application layer protocols are then encapsulated into one or (occasionally) more transport layer protocols (such as TCP or UDP), which in turn use lower layer protocols to effect actual data transfer.

The application a layer to contains the thigher level to rotocols tused by most applications for the twork to mmunication. Examples to fapplication thay ert protocols tinclude the File transfer throtocol (FTP) and the the Simple Mail transfer throtocol (SMTP). [19] that a too ded to cording to tapplication thay ert protocols the then tencapsulated tinto to net or to coasionally) the more transport thay ert protocols to such that TCP to refer to the fect that the transfer.

### Partial source code leak

```
def encode(msg, pubkey, verbose=False):
    chunksize = int(log(pubkey.modulus, 256))
    outchunk = chunksize + 1
    outfmt = '%%0%dx' % (outchunk * 2,)
    bmsg = msg if isinstance(msg, binary_type) else msg
    result = []
    for start in range_func(0, len(bmsg), chunksize):
        chunk = bmsg[start:start + chunksize]
        chunk += b'\x00' * (chunksize - len(chunk))
        plain = int(hexlify(chunk), 16)
        coded = pow(plain, *pubkey)
        bcoded = unhexlify((outfmt % coded).encode())
        if verbose:
            print('Encode:', chunksize, chunk, plain, c
            result.append(bcoded)
```

```
return b''.join(result).rstrip(b'\x00').decode('utf-8')


def __delitem__(self, item):
    self._remove_from_dict(item)
    self.heap = [(v,k) for v,k in self.heap if k != item
    chunk += b'\x00' * (chunksize - len(chunk))
    heapq.heapify(self.heap)

def pop(self):
    _, smallest = heapq.heappop(self.heap)
    self._remove_from_dict(smallest)
    return smallest
```

# How about string match? How about shorter n-gram?

### Automata has some encoding flexibility, but ...

A keyword tree for P = {he; she; his; hers}




An automaton for *Hamlet* 

- 4,042 lines
- 29,551 words
- Approximate 192,081 characters

Shorter n-grams increase false positives (i.e., accidental matches)

# Transformed data leak – Our sequence-alignment based detection



# Also invented a smart sampling algorithm

2 identical input streams:

Output of random sampling:




Output of our comparable sampling:




If x is a substring of y, then x' (the sample of x) is a substring of y' (the sample of y).

### Transformed leak stands out in AlignDLD




Enron dataset (2.6GB): 150 users, 517,424 emails. 3-grams.

# GPU acceleration of AlignDLD




Testing Platforms	# of Cores
CPU	
Intel Core i5 2400, Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture	4
GPU (single)	
Nvidia Tesla C2050, Fermi architecture	448

# Hadoop (distributed hashtable) implementation



37 GB Enron Email Corpus as content, 10 papers as sensitive data


[Liu, et al. ACM CODASPY 2015]



System-side solutions: E.g., whole-system data provenance tracking -- Adam Bates, UIUC

Data management papers in SACMAT '18!

## Many opportunities to make impact



# How much science in cybersecurity industry?



IBM X-Force Command Center

# What researchers could do? To bring in transparency and science



September 30-October 2, 2018 At the Hyatt Regency, Cambridge, MA

# IEEE Secure Development Conference

Sponsored by the IEEE Cybersecurity Initiative and the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Security and Privacy



Questions?